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Global concerns about an impending inﬂ  uenza  pan-
demic escalated when highly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza A sub-
type H5N1 appeared in Nigeria in January 2006. The po-
tential devastation from emergence of a pandemic strain in 
Africa has led to a sudden shift of public health focus to 
pandemic preparedness. Preparedness and control activi-
ties must work within the already strained capacity of health 
infrastructure in Africa to respond to immense existing public 
health problems. Massive attention and resources directed 
toward inﬂ  uenza could distort priorities and damage criti-
cal public health programs. Responses to concerns about 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza should strengthen human and veteri-
nary surveillance and laboratory capacity to help address a 
variety of health threats. Experiences in Asia should provide 
bases for reassessing strategies for Africa and elsewhere. 
Fowl depopulation strategies will need to be adapted for Af-
rica. Additionally, the role of avian vaccines should be com-
prehensively evaluated and clearly deﬁ  ned.
I
n January 2006, chickens in Kano and Kaduna States 
in northern Nigeria exhibited diarrhea and respiratory 
distress and died within a few days. The National Veteri-
nary Research Laboratory in Plateau State isolated inﬂ  u-
enza viruses from these dying chickens. A Food and Ag-
riculture Organization laboratory in Rome conﬁ  rmed that 
the isolates were highly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza A subtype 
H5N1and genetically similar to inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) clade 
2 viruses from China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and 
other countries (1). Ofﬁ  cial reports of the outbreak among 
poultry in Nigeria were disseminated on February 7, 2006, 
which initiated a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 
responses to the arrival of avian inﬂ  uenza in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Subsequently, the inﬂ  uenza viruses subtype H5N1 
isolated in Nigeria were conﬁ  rmed as belonging to 3 dis-
tinct phylogenetic lineages, which suggested independent 
introduction into Nigeria through different sources (2).
Response to Inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) in Africa
After highly pathogenic inﬂ   uenza A virus subtype 
H5N1 was ﬁ  rst detected in Africa, plans were announced 
to implement strategies to eradicate the virus. Nigerian au-
thorities formed a national steering committee led by the 
ministers of health, agriculture, and information. The com-
mittee focused on detection of affected farms, depopulation 
efforts on those farms and in surrounding areas, surveil-
lance for human disease, and dissemination of messages to 
promote understanding and modiﬁ  cation of behaviors that 
encourage virus spread. Despite the endorsement of control 
strategies at the national and state levels, local resources 
were limited and the virus spread widely. By the end of 
February 2006, 4 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital 
Territory, all within central and northern parts of the coun-
try, had conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza virus subtype H5N1 outbreaks 
in poultry, and presence of the virus was suspected in 9 
other states. More than 770,000 birds had either died from 
illness or were culled. Bilateral donor agencies donated >$3 
million, and the World Bank offered $50 million credit to 
add to several million dollars committed by the government 
of Nigeria. However, efforts to get human, material, and 
ﬁ  nancial resources rapidly to locally affected areas were 
inadequate, which stiﬂ  ed well-conceived national control 
efforts. By early June, 14 Nigerian states had conﬁ  rmed 
cases of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection in birds, and several 
hundred thousand additional birds were reported dead, in-
cluding chickens, geese, and ducks. Niger and Cameroon 
had also conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) outbreaks near the 
Nigerian border.
Despite continued spread of H5N1 subtype among 
poultry, human cases of avian inﬂ  uenza were not identiﬁ  ed 
in Nigeria until January 2007, when 1 human case of in-
fection with inﬂ  uenza virus subtype H5N1 was conﬁ  rmed 
in a woman. However, weaknesses in existing disease sur-
veillance systems limited capacity to detect transmission 
of avian inﬂ  uenza to humans. To rule out avian inﬂ  uenza, 
as of May 2007, specimens from 301 patients have been 
tested in Nigeria.
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That an epizootic of this magnitude in poultry would 
have negative economic and nutritional effects is not sur-
prising. Nigeria’s estimated 140–160 million poultry ac-
count for 10% of its gross domestic product and a substan-
tial proportion of the protein ingested by its 132 million 
people (3). An assessment conducted by the United Nations 
Development Program showed that the greatest adverse ef-
fect was in impoverished areas like rural and semiurban 
Nigeria, affecting especially backyard and medium-scale 
farmers. Egg and chicken sales declined by >80% within 
2 weeks after the announcement of the outbreak; 4 months 
later, sales were still <50% of baseline. Poultry feed sales 
also dropped by >80%; 80% of workers on affected farms 
and 45% on unaffected farms lost their jobs (4). The out-
break caused an immediate decline in chicken consump-
tion, even in areas where the disease was not reported 
among poultry.
In March 2006, avian inﬂ  uenza outbreaks were report-
ed among poultry in Egypt; these reports were followed 
by 38 laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases and 15 human deaths. 
As of May 2007, inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) has been detected 
in fowl in 8 countries neighboring Nigeria and Egypt 
(Figure). Outbreaks of avian inﬂ  uenza have continued in 
Nigeria; as of May 2007, 24 of 36 states had documented 
avian inﬂ  uenza in poultry. In many other countries in East 
and West Africa, bird die-offs were reported, but related 
disease (inﬂ  uenza A subtype H5N1) in humans has not 
been conﬁ  rmed. Whether the lack of reported human cas-
es in sub-Saharan Africa, when compared with Egypt, is 
due to differences in surveillance systems or in animal 
handling practices that would promote transmission to hu-
mans is not clear.
Implications of Avian Inﬂ  uenza Emergence 
in Africa on Pandemic Preparedness
The next inﬂ  uenza pandemic, if it plays out like the 
1918 pandemic, would likely cause more deaths propor-
tionately in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the 
world (5). Poor nutritional status, high rates of concurrent 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and limited access to health-
care could contribute to high mortality rates (5). The devas-
tating effect of pandemic inﬂ  uenza would likely exacerbate 
unaddressed public health problems and require immense 
humanitarian emergency assistance, which might not be 
feasible because of limited available global resources and 
restrictions on movement of persons worldwide.
Sub-Saharan Africa is uniquely characterized by vast 
geographic areas that are difﬁ  cult to access; uneven socio-
economic development; nearly transcontinental limitations 
in epidemiologic, surveillance, and laboratory capacity; 
and profound infrastructure weaknesses relating to com-
munications and health systems and capacity of govern-
ment organizations to effectively focus limited resources. 
An awareness of this situation has brought substantial pres-
sure on nations in Africa to implement or strengthen detec-
tion and rapid response capacities. Animal health strategies 
have focused on improving surveillance in birds, enhanc-
ing laboratory capability to detect inﬂ  uenza A, including 
H5 strains, and supporting teams to do rapid depopulation. 
On the human side, an early warning system is needed for 
an emerging inﬂ  uenza pandemic, i.e., surveillance to detect 
clusters of inﬂ  uenza-like illness in healthcare facilities and 
communities and to rapidly conﬁ  rm them as inﬂ  uenza in 
the ﬁ  eld and at qualiﬁ  ed laboratories.
Effective preparedness and responses will require 
fresh, innovative thinking relevant to local circumstances, 
determination, political will, and national and internation-
al resources. The African Regional Ofﬁ  ce (AFRO) of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and its country ofﬁ  ces 
have a clear mandate to address regional impending and 
ongoing health crises. Partners, including other United 
Nations agencies, development organizations, and allied 
nongovernment organizations, should line up with AFRO 
and national ministries of health and livestock to encourage 
and catalyze multisectoral government and nongovernment 
commitment and action.
Balancing Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Concerns 
with Ongoing Health Priorities
The potential effects of pandemic inﬂ  uenza on human 
health and political stability in sub-Saharan Africa cannot 
be denied. Of paramount concern, however, is that this 
Figure. Map of Africa, documenting spread of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1). Preparedness for Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic in Africa
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potential disaster emerges onto a backdrop of countries 
struggling to address epidemics of HIV, tuberculosis, and 
malaria; resurgence of paralytic poliomyelitis; and high 
childhood mortality rates due to pneumonia and diarrheal 
diseases. Many of the severe effects of these diseases could 
be prevented by use of proven public health tools (e.g., 
antiretroviral drugs; improved detection and treatment of 
tuberculosis; insecticide-treated bednets; vaccines against 
Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus inﬂ  uenzae type 
b, and rotavirus), but African countries lack the resources 
and infrastructure to take full advantage of these tools. 
In fact, the frenetic global activity around avian inﬂ  u-
enza’s potential threat to human health is diverting criti-
cal ﬁ  nancial and human resources and focus from the real 
ongoing, distressing effects of the major infectious disease 
syndromes. This diversion may be acceptable for a short 
time if the most pressing challenges for preparedness 
can be quickly and effectively addressed. However, for 
many months, ministries of health personnel in countries 
throughout Africa have been deeply immersed in pandemic 
preparedness and response planning; they have been pulled 
away from routine activities, and critical programs have 
been put on hold. In Nigeria, while senior health ofﬁ  cials 
were struggling to maintain Global Fund resources for HIV 
and malaria, as well as to improve polio vaccination cover-
age and stop the export of polio to other nations, consider-
able immediate pressure was exerted to ramp up inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance, containment, and preparedness activities after 
the initial conﬁ  rmation of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1). Similar-
ly, when avian inﬂ  uenza was conﬁ  rmed in poultry in Juba, 
Sudan, in September 2006, the newly formed Ministry of 
Health staff of the government of South Sudan had to bal-
ance already demanding commitments to battle HIV, tuber-
culosis, and an ongoing cholera epidemic with the need to 
prepare for potential inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1) infection of 
humans. The substantial effort required added more weight 
to a grossly overstressed public health system.
Tension between existing disease concerns and the 
potential threat of a pandemic raises several questions: 
whose concern is avian inﬂ  uenza; and what are appropri-
ate, balanced responses, particularly in countries with se-
verely limited public health resources and overwhelming 
health problems? A pandemic strain emerging in Africa is 
a global concern as much as an African concern. Without 
rapid detection systems and effective control measures, a 
highly transmittable strain would quickly spread globally. 
Wealthier nations have recognized this and pledged nearly 
$2.5 billion to address the problem, although most is not 
speciﬁ  cally for use in Africa.
In addition, an inﬂ  ux of massive resources from more 
developed nations, if not well coordinated and balanced 
in scope, could distort the sense of priorities and damage 
other critical public health and agricultural programs. How 
then can a balance be achieved and result in appropriate 
enhancements to address the threat of pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
while keeping focus on the existing major health priorities 
facing Africa? One approach, detailed below, would be to 
use new resources in a way that is broadly applicable to 
building public health capacity in recipient nations.
Improving Pandemic Preparedness 
The need and resources for rapid detection of potential-
ly pandemic strains of inﬂ  uenza should be leveraged with 
support for surveillance (Table) for other epidemic-prone 
and vaccine-preventable diseases; parallel, vertical systems 
will ultimately not be sustainable in Africa. The drive for 
improved inﬂ  uenza surveillance can fuel the implemen-
tation of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response 
(IDSR), promoted by WHO and its partners and endorsed 
in 1998 by 46 countries in the African region (6–8). IDSR 
includes surveillance for vaccine-preventable diseases and 
epidemic-prone diseases such as meningococcal disease, 
measles, cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, and viral hem-
orrhagic fever. If functioning well, IDSR should provide 
health ofﬁ  cials with signals when disease incidence passes 
thresholds, suggesting an impending epidemic and the need 
to ramp up disease prevention activities like vaccination, 
safe water campaigns, or quarantine. Presently, however, 
IDSR is functional in a few countries, including Eritrea, 
Ghana, and Kenya. Strengthening IDSR throughout Africa 
would create an effective early warning system capable 
of detecting a pandemic strain of inﬂ  uenza or clusters of 
patients with severe acute respiratory illness, which could 
signal the beginning of person-to-person transmission. 
Early detection of a pandemic would facilitate the timely 
implementation of pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical 
containment measures. In addition, strengthening IDSR 
would have the dual beneﬁ  t of enhancing capacity for early 
detection of outbreaks of more conventional diseases and 
perhaps currently unrecognized threats.
For IDSR to effectively function as an early warning 
system for inﬂ  uenza and other communicable diseases, a 
Table. Surveillance enhancements needed to address pandemic influenza and other emerging threats, Africa 
Method Needs
Integrated disease surveillance and response 
S
Resources, training, local commitment 
urveillance among health workers, students  Standard operating procedures, resources 
Mobile phone messaging  Resources and targeted application of existing technologies 
Veterinary surveillance for zoonoses Political will to encourage stronger linkages between health and animal 
ministries, resources, effective models to emulate GLOBAL POVERTY  PERSPECTIVE
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number of steps should be taken. First, additional resourc-
es should be made available for ﬁ  eld training of national 
and local staff and subsequent site assessments. Second, 
this conventional public healthcare facility–based sur-
veillance system should be expanded to cover private 
healthcare institutions and include community-level sur-
veillance, through reporting by village chiefs, traditional 
healers, dispensaries, and primary schools. Finally, ex-
isting technology in Africa should be leveraged to make 
IDSR a user-friendly, more efﬁ  cient surveillance system. 
The widespread use of mobile telephones and extensive 
mobile phone networks throughout Africa could be ex-
tremely helpful for reporting unusual health occurrences 
through inexpensive, potentially automated, text messag-
ing to an identiﬁ  ed, widely recognized, and toll-free num-
ber. Reports of disease clusters could then be immediately 
veriﬁ  ed and investigated by public health personnel (9). 
This tool could also be used for animal surveillance.
Intersectoral Communication and Collaboration
With similar urgency, enhanced veterinary surveillance 
and strong, functional networks of communication and 
collaboration between animal and human health experts 
would increase potential for prevention of transmission of 
inﬂ  uenza from animals to humans. Currently, linkages and 
communication mechanisms between health and veterinary 
ofﬁ  cials are neither explicit nor functional. A major chal-
lenge in Nigeria’s response to avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) was 
to ensure communication between Ministry of Health and 
Ministry of Agriculture staffs on the ground so that when 
poultry outbreaks occurred on farms, the Ministry of Health 
was alerted to look for human cases. 
Laboratory Capacity
Resources for improving infrastructure to address 
threats of avian inﬂ  uenza must be channeled to improve lo-
cal laboratory capacity and strengthen laboratory networks. 
WHO and AFRO have a critical role to promote, select, 
develop, train, and sustain laboratory capacity for diagno-
sis of inﬂ  uenza within regional reference laboratories and 
national inﬂ  uenza centers. AFRO has already designated 
several existing laboratories in Africa as regional refer-
ence laboratories for testing seasonal and avian inﬂ  uenza 
in humans. With enhanced surveillance, these laboratories 
should be able to rapidly conﬁ  rm or rule out inﬂ  uenza as 
the cause of a cluster of severe respiratory illness, which 
would allow for rapid epidemic responses. Already, labo-
ratories in several countries in Africa have been upgraded, 
laboratorians have been trained, equipment (real-time and 
conventional PCR machines) and appropriate reagents 
(primers and probes) have been procured, and quality con-
trol mechanisms have been put in place so that PCR can 
be used in a timely manner to reliably document the pres-
ence of highly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza A virus subtype H5N1. 
With additional reagents and training, these laboratories 
could have the capacity to rapidly detect causes for oth-
er outbreaks and assist with surveillance for routine and 
emerging diseases. As laboratory surveillance is initiated 
and strengthened, training, leveraging of equipment main-
tenance and service contracts, and resource sharing across 
animal and human facilities will be essential.
Epidemiologic Capacity
Being prepared for an inﬂ  uenza pandemic will require 
having a well-trained corps of epidemiologists. Field epi-
demiology training programs and Public Health Schools 
without Walls are in place in several countries in Africa; 
these programs are successfully training medical doctors 
(and laboratorians in the case of Kenya’s Field Epidemi-
ology and Laboratory Training Program) to become pub-
lic health experts. To minimize out-migration, graduates 
should be rewarded through career advancement pathways 
within national public health systems.
Response and Containment
In a joint effort by WHO and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, rapid outbreak response teams are 
being trained in sub-Saharan African countries to recognize 
outbreaks, collect information and specimens, and imple-
ment quarantine measures, if indicated, while using and 
distributing personal protective equipment and antiviral 
drugs. Training rapid response teams in each country is a 
relatively new concept for Africa, but such teams in Asia 
have responded to dengue epidemics and, more recently, 
to avian inﬂ  uenza. If these teams are functional, they will 
strengthen responses in Africa to a wide array of epidemics, 
enabling timely implementation of interventions to prevent 
illness and death.
Should a major health disaster such as an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic occur, essentially no capacity exists to appropri-
ately address the healthcare crisis while continuing to deal 
with other routine health problems, which themselves can 
at times overwhelmingly stress healthcare systems. Prepa-
ration for a pandemic must strengthen hospital capacity 
to optimally and safely manage severely ill patients with 
potentially highly contagious illnesses. Although aiming 
for parity with hospitals in industrialized nations on qual-
ity standards for infection control is excessively ambitious, 
simple, practical approaches to implement basic infection 
control measures developed by WHO can be used (10).
Although data on the topic are limited, public aware-
ness of avian inﬂ  uenza is minimal in Africa, speciﬁ  cally 
concerning the link between dying birds and human ill-
ness and the potential of catastrophic emergence of pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza. The United Nations Children’s Fund has 
conducted participatory action research, which has shown Preparedness for Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic in Africa
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that while community outreach campaigns will be needed 
across the continent, messages must be locally customized 
because of wide variations in literacy, awareness, experi-
ence, and beliefs (11). Recent efforts to strengthen informa-
tion, education, and communication in Africa will improve 
societal mobilization for behavior modiﬁ  cation capacity, 
which can be called upon to address public health threats 
(12). Ultimately, by developing effective health commu-
nication measures, functional surveillance systems with 
strong epidemiologic and laboratory support, and capable 
multisectoral rapid response teams, it may be possible to 
curtail spread of a lethal pandemic strain and buy time to 
develop and deliver effective human-administered vaccines 
(13,14). 
A Call for New Strategies
In Asia, the principal control approach has been depop-
ulation of poultry in affected and nearby farms along with 
attempts to restrict movement of poultry and poultry prod-
ucts from affected areas. Even when aggressively pursued, 
these efforts were not always timely or comprehensive, and 
avian inﬂ  uenza became endemic among birds in many parts 
of Asia and has now spread to Europe and Africa. The dif-
fuse spread of the virus in avian species and some transmis-
sion to humans and other mammals has provided numerous 
opportunities for a pandemic virus to appear; however, a 
strain easily transmittable from person to person has not yet 
emerged. Although this provides some comfort for now, a 
variety of ecologic and health factors could affect the emer-
gence of a devastating pandemic strain.
The massive geographic spread of avian inﬂ  uenza in 
birds should cause a re-evaluation of bird depopulation as 
the principal strategy for control. Although depopulation 
appears to have worked when the virus was localized dur-
ing 1997 in Hong Kong and 1.5 million birds were culled, 
widespread presence of the virus in migratory and domestic 
birds has severely limited the usefulness of this approach. 
In addition to direct costs, massive culling operations 
dramatically affect the economic and nutritional status of 
impoverished people. Compensation programs, critical 
to success of culling efforts, have not been implemented 
optimally in most countries where inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) 
epizootics have occurred. Without credible, adequate, and 
rapidly implemented compensation programs linked to 
depopulation efforts, farmers are not encouraged to report 
bird die-offs and may transport birds to unaffected areas, 
thereby spreading the virus (15). Furthermore, depopula-
tion may counter evolutionary pressure. If the birds that 
survive local outbreaks are the ﬁ  ttest, killing them provides 
no evolutionary advantage to survival. 
Vaccination of poultry may be a useful adjunct to de-
population in a deﬁ  ned area surrounding an affected farm 
(ring depopulation). Some available vaccines seem to pro-
vide immunity to infection without substantially prolong-
ing viral shedding (16–19). If so, focusing vaccination pro-
grams on farms around affected areas may be a less costly, 
more socially acceptable, and more effective solution than 
mass culling, with or without compensation. Effective use 
of inﬂ  uenza vaccines in avian populations could theoreti-
cally reduce the risk for emergence of a pandemic strain 
by decreasing the numbers of circulating avian inﬂ  uenza 
strains that could mutate or reassort with other circulating 
inﬂ  uenza viruses (19). Additionally, use of emergency vac-
cination can be effective in conjunction with other measures 
at the time of poultry outbreaks (19). Ultimately, control 
measures will be implemented by agriculture and livestock 
ministries, which must address potentially conﬂ  icting com-
mercial and public health interests.
Current vaccine supplies for poultry in risk areas may 
be insufﬁ  cient. A clear avian vaccination strategy, articulat-
ed and implemented by international organizations, would 
encourage adequate production of effective vaccines for 
use in currently and prospectively affected areas. Analyses 
comparing costs and potential cost-effectiveness of depop-
ulation and vaccination strategies (and strategies that use 
both approaches) would be helpful.
The Path Forward
Activities to address the threat of pandemic inﬂ  uen-
za should, whenever possible, build upon existing public 
health systems and enhance available health infrastructure 
rather than create new systems. In Vietnam, for instance, 
research organizations like Oxford University and The 
Wellcome Trust, and partners they support, were able to 
refocus their efforts onto avian inﬂ   uenza and provide 
substantial new knowledge relevant for protecting health 
(20,21). Likewise in Africa, many nongovernment and re-
ligious organizations can build on their existing networks 
and groundwork to assist governments with surveillance 
and risk-reduction efforts, as has been the case for initia-
tives to address HIV/AIDS, provide safe water, and eradi-
cate poliomyelitis (22–26).
Identifying existing laboratory and disease-reporting 
mechanisms in individual countries is crucial so they can 
be augmented to achieve sustainable capacity for surveil-
lance for inﬂ  uenza and other emerging diseases. National 
disease reporting systems—IDSR and polio surveillance—
may provide entry points for such activity but will require 
strategic investments that in large part need to be deﬁ  ned in 
the context of national priorities and balanced with global 
needs. Early detection and improvement of the continent’s 
preparedness for emerging diseases has been brought into 
focus by the recent adoption of a treaty by the World Health 
Assembly of new International Health Regulations (IHR 
[2005]), which now compels countries to have more ef-
fective surveillance and reporting systems to improve the GLOBAL POVERTY  PERSPECTIVE
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ability for early detection of global disease threats (27). 
More speciﬁ  c to inﬂ  uenza, IHR (2005) compels countries 
to implement optimal communications, rapid risk assess-
ment, and containment and response measures, should a 
pandemic strain emerge.
An old expression says, “You can’t slide uphill.” The 
difﬁ  cult work associated with preparedness for pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza will help bring Africa closer to the top of the hill, 
making it possible to efﬁ  ciently respond to this and other 
threats and, when necessary, slide toward a beneﬁ  cial out-
come.
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